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After significant reforms, Canada’s political parties now have
their income and expenditure closely controlled, and are more
dependent on public funds.
Many democracies including the US and UK have struggled with party funding reform. Canada
is unusual in its ban on funding from corporations and trade unions. As part of USApp’s
coverage of US neighbors, Canada and Mexico, Stephen Crone  examines how party funding
had been reformed in Canada.  In the last decade, Canada has seen its regulatory system for
party funding shift rapidly from one of spending controls and moderate public funding, to one
where both income and expenditure are exhaustively regulated, and parties rely to a far
greater extent on public funds.
The f irst Canadian f oray into polit ical f inance regulation came in 1874, with the Dominion Elections
Act establishing a very limited system of  candidate expenditure reporting. Based on Britain’s Corrupt
Practices Act of  1854, the legislation was passed largely in response to the “Pacif ic Scandal” of  1873.
Further ef f orts at ref orm were attempted during the f irst half  of  the twentieth century, but these are
generally considered to have been piecemeal and inef f ectual. Indeed, the f irst ‘major ’ ref orm of  Canadian
party f unding law did not arrive until a hundred years af ter the Dominion Elections Act, when, in 1974,
the Election Expenses Act was passed with the support of  what were then Canada’s three largest parties
(f or details of  the Act, see Box 1 below). The 1974 Act marked a sea change in Canada’s approach to party
f inance regulation; the liberal Victorian legacy was ditched, and was replaced instead by a more rigorous
system of  expenditure controls, increased transparency and moderate public f unding. By successf ully
addressing the growing concern with the Canadian system of  polit ical f inance, moreover, the Act lasted
more or less unchanged f or almost thirty years – a longevity which many have attributed to its general
ef f ectiveness.
Box 1: The Election Expenses Act (1974)
Through amendments to the Canada Elections Act, the Election Expenses Act introduced:
1. Expenditure limits: spending by candidates, polit ical parties and third parties was capped f or f ederal
elections.
2. Disclosure requirements: candidates and parties were required to submit details of  their revenues
and expenditure.
3. Enf orcement: an independent commissioner was appointed, charged with ensuring compliance with
the new regulations.
4. Indirect state f unding: tax credits were introduced f or donations up to a certain limit; certain
campaign expenses became eligible f or reimbursement by the state – provided eligibility criteria were
met.
5. Free broadcasting time: rules were introduced to ensure the f ree and f air allocation of  broadcasting
time to polit ical parties.
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The long period of  regulatory stability inaugurated by the Election Expenses Act of  1974 was brought to an
abrupt end in 2003, however, when a major package of  party f unding ref orms was passed by Jean
Chretien’s Liberal government. A response, in part, to the series of  damaging polit ical scandals which had
beset the governing party, Chretien’s Bill C-24 altered the landscape of  Canadian polit ical f inance
dramatically. Yet unlike the Election Expenses Act of  1974, Bill C-24 did not command f ull cross-
parliamentary support: the Progressive Conservative Party and the Canadian Alliance both opposed the
Liberals’ bill, and their successors – the Conservative Party – have since gone on to make f urther radical
changes to the laws when in minority government between 2006 and 2011. Indeed, Stephen Harper ’s newly-
elected majority government has recently announced its intention to phase out one of  the cornerstones of
the 2003 settlement, the money-per-vote subsidy, in a move which is widely-expected to have devastating
f inancial consequences f or Canada’s opposition parties.
Box 2: Provisions of the current system
The Liberals’ amendments to the Canada Elections Act and the Income Tax Act by Bill C-24 in 2003 – as well
as the Conservatives’ own Accountability Act of  2006 – have created a system with the f ollowing additional
f eatures:
1. Donation caps: trade unions and corporations are no longer permitted to donate to candidates or
polit ical parties. Individual donations are allowed, but are capped at $1,100.
2. Enhanced disclosure requirements: all polit ical entit ies – including district party associations,
nomination contestants, leadership contestants, third parties, polit ical parties and f ederal election
candidates – must now register and report with Elections Canada. Parties must submit quarterly
reports.
3. Enhanced expenditure limits: nomination candidates are now also subject to spending limits.
4. Direct state f unding: parties receive a quarterly allowance based on the number of  votes won at the
previous general election, now set at a rate of  $2.04 per vote af ter adjustments f or inf lation.
5. Increased indirect state f unding: the tax credit scheme was extended and the level of  reimbursement
f or campaign expenses was increased.
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During the last decade, the Canadian regulatory system has thus shif ted rapidly f rom a regime of  spending
controls and moderate public f unding, to a system where both income and expenditure are exhaustively
regulated and parties depend to a f ar greater extent on public f unds (f or f urther details of  the current
system, see Box 2 above). This makes Canada unique among countries of  the Westminster tradit ion:
neither the UK, New Zealand or Australia have sought to restrict party income to the same extent as
Canada, or of f er such generous public subsidies. Yet the f ailure of  the Liberals to implement this new
system consensually arguably placed it in jeopardy f rom the very beginning. Indeed, by establishing a
precedent f or unilateral action with respect to party f unding regulations, the issue has since become
something of  a ‘polit ical f ootball’ – with additional, partisan ref orms passed by the Conservatives
which entrench the advantages accidentally granted to them by the Liberals’ legislation of  2003.
Canadian party funding regulations under the microscope
Though its f uture may now be imperilled f ollowing the election of  a Conservative majority government in
2011, the system of  party f inance regulation introduced by the Liberals in 2003 – which includes the now
doomed money-per-vote public subsidy – has actually had a number of  salutary ef f ects on Canadian
democracy. Admittedly, these benef its are scarcely ever the ones imagined by of f icial inquiries into party
f unding in other countries, like the UK. There is lit t le evidence, f or instance, to support the expectation that
the per-vote-public subsidy would promote stronger local party organisation in Canada, or indeed that it
would ‘get the vote out even in those areas where [parties] did not tradit ionally succeed’. Similarly, the UK
Constitutional Af f airs Committee’s  bold claim that the Canadian example shows how ‘radical changes in the
way party f inance is regulated and supported’ are possible ‘without losing the tradit ional links between
institutions and parties even when f inancial links are removed’, only captures half  of  the truth. Although,
overall, the Committee was correct that, in Canada, the NDP-union link has persevered despite the banning
of  trade union donations to polit ical parties, its very brief  account necessarily f ailed to mention any of  the
other negative or ambiguous side-ef f ects that the ban has had on the relationship between the two
groups.
On the other hand, however, there remain a whole series of  posit ive ef f ects of  the current Canadian
system which inquiries in the UK have previously f ailed to consider. Nowhere has it ever been mentioned,
f or instance, how increased public f unding has impacted on diversity within the Canadian party system. This
is important, as contrary to crit ics’ concerns that public f unding of  polit ical parties ossif ies party systems,
money-per-vote public f unding in Canada has in f act opened the door to parties, such as the Greens, that
were previously lef t outside the exclusive parliamentary club. Indeed, one could argue that, in many ways,
the introduction of  stricter donation restrictions and more substantial public f unding has created a f ar more
equitable and democratic balance of  f inancial power in the party system. Keith Ewing, f or instance, rightly
argues that, although Liberal f inancial hegemony has, essentially, been replaced by that of  the
Conservative Party in recent years:
‘it is hard to deny that this is a better inequality than the inequality that existed before the
legislation was introduced. It is better because it is based on levels of grass-roots support, it is
an inequality that is not accounted for by large donations from sources of doubtful legitimacy.’
Similarly, while the UK’s Constitutional Af f airs Committee’s report on party f unding may have looked at the
impact of  trade union and corporate donation bans on the links between the NDP and trade unions, no
of f icial report has considered what ef f ects the new donation restrictions have had on polit ical equality.
Some argue that by proscribing corporate and union donations, the responsiveness of  polit ical parties to
ordinary cit izens (as opposed to ‘special interests’) will increase. There is some evidence to suggest that
this may have happened in Canada, as although turnout has remained stagnant, the number of  individuals
donating to polit ical parties did increase by 37,564 over a f our year period between 2002 and 2006,
representing a 27 per cent increase in the ‘pool’ of  donors .
It is impossible, of  course, f or any party f unding regime to f ully excise the inf luence that wealth can have in
distorting the democratic process. Despite the egalitarian emphasis of  the donation caps introduced in
2003, there is some evidence to suggest that they have led to the emergence of  US-style “bundling”
techniques to circumvent the law. Nevertheless, while the ref orms to the Canadian system of  party f inance
may have minor shortcomings, they have also provided clear (if  ‘modest’) benef its. The legislation has not,
of  course, created perf ect polit ical equality between cit izens or led to any real revival in grassroots activity;
but it has probably succeeded in reducing polit ical inequalit ies, increasing the responsiveness of  parties to
the electorate, opening up the party system, and broadening the parties’ f unding base. Though donations
by individuals to polit ical parties in Canada may continue to create some possibility of  plutocratic inf luence,
there is lit t le evidence, moreover, of  a ‘big donor ’ culture comparable to that in the UK. It is f or these
reasons – rather than the ones imagined by of f icial inquiries – that the attractiveness of  the Canadian
model elsewhere is understandable.
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